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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:26 pm
Time: 8:26 pm
Results for unemployment insurance
1 results foundAuthor: Fuller, David L. Title: Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring Summary: The most prevalent incentive problem in the U.S. unemployment insurance system is that individuals collect unemployment benefits while being gainfully employed. We show how the unemployment insurance authority can efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Details: St. Louis, MO: Federal Research Bank of St. Louis, 2012. 41p. Source: Internet Resource:Working Paper 2012-024A: Accessed August 6, 2012 at: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-024.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-024.pdf Shelf Number: 125868 Keywords: Insurance FraudUnemployment and CrimeUnemployment Insurance |